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Organizational hypocrisy in business schools with sustainability commitments: the 
drivers of talk-action inconsistency 
 
Abstract:  
Business schools are criticized for not walking-the-talk given their sustainability rhetoric and 
the expectation they educate future managers to act responsibly, balancing economic aims with 
the social and environmental impacts of business operations.  While hypocrisy has long been 
part of the debate, few studies have systematically analysed organizational hypocrisy in 
business schools which have made commitments to deliver sustainable management education.  
We address this gap by studying the extent of sustainability teaching or ‘action’ in MBA 
programs at UK business schools with sustainability ‘talk’ and strategic ‘decisions’ to 
implement sustainability.  We contribute to organizational hypocrisy theory by developing a 
framework of organizational and lower-level factors which drive inadvertent organizational 
hypocrisy.  Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) we examine interviews 
with 23 MBA directors to understand how these factors, in combination, explain an inadvertent 
kind of organizational hypocrisy.  Our results emphasize the importance of sustainability 
capability in delivering on sustainability commitments. 
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1. Introduction 
Business schools, long accused of hypocrisy in their societal mission (e.g. Gioia & 
Corley, 2002), are under pressure to evolve their traditional approach to education.  
Specifically, they are asked to facilitate the development of sustainability literate managers 
who are socially responsible and environmentally aware and who see beyond the profit 
maximizing imperative to account for the common good and societal welfare (Bieger, 2011; 
Marshall, Vaiman, & Napier, 2010).  In response to this many business schools have signed up 
to charters such as the United Nations’ Principles of Responsible Management Education 
(UN’s PRME) and taken other steps to signal a commitment to education that involves 
sustainable and responsible business practices. This commitment recognizes a requirement for 
business schools to integrate sustainability-related concepts into their curricula, research and 
other activities.  Yet despite this organizational ‘talk’, questions remain about the extent to 
which these issues really do become embedded in business schools’ ‘action’ (Burchall, 
Kennedy & Murray, 2015; Doherty, Meehan & Richards, 2015).   
The failure of business schools to “walk-the-talk” (Boyle, 2004:47) when it comes to 
including sustainability in their educational programs, and particularly their MBAs, has been 
debated in recent years (e.g. Navarro, 2008; Rasche & Gilbert, 2015).  Scholars argue that more 
is required of business schools to not only signal a commitment to sustainable and responsible 
business education, but also to deliver it (Cornuel & Hommel, 2015). This work suggests that 
hypocrisy is a feature of sustainability in management education where business school talk is, 
at times, inconsistent with action when it comes to educating managers about social and 
environmental responsibilities.  Hypocrisy is also indicated by scholars who explain that 
superficiality can be expected for those business schools who face a continual pressure to boost 
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their own status (Alvesson & Gabriel, 2016).  Issues relating to status and the management of 
image and reputation and the creation brand identities are also a growing concern in higher 
education more broadly, given an increasingly competitive environment (Hemsley-Brown, 
Melewar, Nguyen & Wilson, 2016).  However, despite these literatures which recognize the 
existence of pressures to ‘look good’, less is known about how hypocrisy comes about in higher 
education and in particular, business schools. 
Organizational hypocrisy involves a distinction between the formal organization, as 
articulated through policies and mission statements, and the informal organization, which 
reflects how the organization actually operates (Brunsson, 1993b). Organizational hypocrisy 
may stem from a case of “hypocrisy of duplicity” (Christensen, Morsing & Thyssen, 
2013:378), where the intention is to deceive (Siano et al., 2017).  But organizational hypocrisy 
can also arise less intentionally, where consistent action fails to materialize for other reasons 
(Christensen et al., 2013) and thus the result is an inadvertent rather than intended form of 
organizational hypocrisy. This unintended form of hypocrisy has received less empirical 
attention, despite being implicitly acknowledged (Lacey & Groves, 2014; Pettersen, 1999). 
While unintended organizational hypocrisy still manifests in double-standards, this is seldom 
the result of “intentional planning on the part of any one person” Brunsson (1993a:4).   
Three reasons – resources, knowledge and control – are deemed by Brunsson (1993b) 
to be important in explaining the occurrence of organizational hypocrisy.  We develop these 
factors and conceptualize them in a business school context as capacity, capability and latitude.  
To further extend Brunsson’s (1993b) work, we also explicitly account for the role of prestige 
and size in inadvertent organizational hypocrisy.  Drawing organizational characteristics, such 
as prestige and size, into the discussion allows us to explore how different drivers of business 
school behaviour (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015; Snelson-Powell, Grosvold & Millington, 2016), 
impact on inadvertent organizational hypocrisy, in conjunction with lower-level factors. 
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While scholars have drawn on the notion of hypocrisy in business schools before, it has 
been treated as a more general idea (e.g. Boyle, 2004; Gioia & Corley, 2002).  This paper 
instead seeks to theoretically underpin an empirical study of hypocrisy in business schools, by 
explicitly adopting the concept of organizational hypocrisy as a theoretical perspective 
(Brunsson, 1989).  We operationalize organizational hypocrisy as the absence of sustainability 
in MBA programs with external sustainability commitments.  If a school is to walk-the-talk, 
the presence of sustainability in a program that is typically emblematic of the school itself and 
seen as a ‘flag-ship’ (Schleigelmilch & Thomas, 2011), would be required for organizational 
appearances to be in keeping with organizational action.  For business schools with external 
sustainability commitments we therefore propose a research question that examines multiple 
factors to determine how they, together, explain an unintended form of organizational 
hypocrisy: What combinations of organizational characteristics and sub-group level 
conditions influence whether organizational hypocrisy arises at business schools with explicit 
sustainability commitments?   
We approach this question through an analysis of the literature and theory development 
work to first identify the individual conditions at play.  Our aim is to learn more about these 
conditions, confirm their role in contributing to hypocrisy and to understand how these 
conditions operate together in the empirical context of sustainability implementation in 
business school curricula.  To answer our research question we then examine interviews with 
both UK business school deans and MBA directors at those schools, and combine this with 
secondary data for each of our 23 cases. We use fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA), which is increasingly adopted in business research (e.g. Misangyi et al., 2017; Seny 
Kan et al., 2016; Wagemann, Buche, & Siewert, 2016) providing a systematic approach to help 
identify cross-case patterns in qualitative data.  
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Our work makes several distinct contributions. Firstly, the theoretical refinements 
offered by this study relate to a specific focus on organizational hypocrisy as an inadvertent 
situation, which has otherwise received less systematic attention in studies thus far.  This kind 
of hypocrisy, we argue, is less akin to strategic manipulation, where action is deliberately 
avoided or misdirected, and better accounted for as implementation inadequacies where 
managerial attempts to exert control, fail.  This perspective involves taking account of the 
organizational hierarchy, and considering internal organizational factors further away from 
managerial control (Brunsson, 1993b).  It integrates the factors that govern the circumstances 
of people inside the organization, who are closer to the action, with factors that relate to 
organizational effectiveness, such as prestige and size. Doing so responds directly to calls for 
research into the role of organizational facets that help or hinder sustainability integration 
(Slager, Pouryousefi, Moon & Schoolman 2018), as well as to more fully account for how talk, 
decision and action traverse hierarchies in organizations (Brunsson, 1993b), and to better 
conceptualize how different kinds of firms come to exhibit inadvertent forms of organizational 
hypocrisy.   
Secondly, by drawing on fsQCA, a set-theoretic method, we are able to show how 
prestige, size, capability, capacity and latitude, in conjunction, facilitate or impede inadvertent 
organizational hypocrisy. The nuanced insight enabled by fsQCA also informs our final 
contribution, that of managerial implications.  We find that business schools wishing to prevent 
hypocrisy relating to their sustainability commitments should focus on developing capability, 
the skills and knowledge that relate to sustainability, rather than adding capacity and simply 
increasing the resources available for the task.  
This paper continues with an overview of the empirical context and a review of the 
literature on sustainability at business schools. We then develop our theory in relation to what 
shapes inadvertent organizational hypocrisy. Next, we outline our method and research design 
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before the presenting the results of the fsQCA performed.   A discussion section interprets these 
results and finally a conclusion section summarises our key contributions to the theory of 
organizational hypocrisy, implications of the research and future research directions.  
2. Sustainability at business schools 
Sustainability is broadly defined and requires the economic activity of firms to also 
account for social and environmental responsibilities (Moon, 2007). The past decade has 
witnessed a surge in business schools across the world pledging to respond to the 
sustainability imperative (Locke, 2006). As educators of future managers and providers of 
tomorrow’s corporate knowledge, business schools face an increased expectation to be more 
sustainable, responsible and ethical (Reficco & Jaén, 2015).  In practice, this means that 
business schools are expected to teach students about sustainability-related concepts including 
business ethics and CSR (Matten & Moon, 2004).  While there exists a wide range of 
interpretations (Matten & Moon, 2004) there is a broad understanding that all management 
students must appreciate the imperative for firms to address social and environmental 
responsibilities in their pursuit of economic returns (Doherty et al., 2015).  However, with no 
precise formula for what sustainability education must be (Stubbs & Schapper, 2011) there 
remain practical challenges for how business schools might deliver on their missions and 
strategy.  
There has been a sharp increase in business schools making explicit sustainability-
related commitments in the form of membership of bodies such as the UN’s PRME and the 
Academy for Business in Society (ABIS) or by incorporating these values into external 
strategic mission statements, creating a public face of compliance by indicating their 
organizational policy (Reficco & Jaén, 2015). Research to date suggests that some business 
schools respond to this pressure symbolically (e.g. Snelson-Powell et al., 2016), rather than 
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with substantive compliance. Moratis’s (2016) study of Dutch MBAs suggests we should be 
skeptical of the role of PRME in implementing substantive change.  He argues that such 
standards may be perceived as instruments that enable hypocrisy, rather than a means to align 
commitments with organizational activities.  Moratis (2016:237) introduces the notion of 
“responsibility erosion” which can arise when CSR (corporate social responsibility) and 
sustainability is implemented through standards.  Louw’s (2015) critical discourse analysis of 
UK PRME signatories’ Sharing Information on Progress (SIP) reports found that claims of 
organizational change as consequence of PRME adoption were exaggerated.  There is thus a 
context where hypocrisy is readily apparent, but studies are yet to establish how this comes 
about. 
Prior research, which has sought to understand what facilitates or hampers 
sustainability integration, has stressed the importance of faculty interest, as key to driving 
sustainability integration (Matten & Moon, 2004; Moon & Orlitzky, 2011, Murphy, Sharma & 
Moon, 2012) as well as the concentration of resources available (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015), such 
as dedicated research centres (Moon & Orlitzky, 2011).  These ideas correspond with Doherty 
et al.’s (2015) findings that the barriers to responsibility in management education are largely 
down to factors relating to individual resistance as well as organizational resource constraints.  
In Slager et al.’s (2018) study of sustainability centres, they note that questions remain as to 
whether business schools, due their inherent links with private organizations, are even capable 
of supporting innovations around sustainability in the curriculum, in anything more than a 
superficial way.  While the changes to accreditations’ standards may encourage more formal 
compliance, it perhaps makes continuing hypocrisy just as likely, but less easy to observe, with 




Among this research is an important tranche of scholarship that identifies business 
school prestige as an important driver in embedding sustainability in practice.  Prestigious 
schools are expected to be in the vanguard of sustainable management education, but in practice 
are observed to be lacking in what they deliver (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015).   On the other hand, 
Moon and Orlitzky (2011) find evidence of strong engagement with CSR and sustainability 
education for more prestigious business schools.  A similar finding was identified by Snelson-
Powell et al. (2016) who found that less prestigious business schools performed relatively less 
well in terms of the scope of the sustainability education provided. Given these conflicting 
findings, further research is required to examine these relationships.   
Also absent from earlier work is a study of how these kinds of organizational 
characteristics, such as relative prestige, function together with internal reasons (Brunsson, 
1993b) to shape sustainability integration.  It is this gap in the literature we seek to contribute 
to by examining the role of prestige, size as well as capability, capacity and latitude in 
inadvertent organizational hypocrisy for business schools with sustainability commitments.  
3. Facilitators and barriers of organizational hypocrisy 
Organizational hypocrisy (Brunsson, 1993b) provides an alternative lens to more 
traditional perspectives which assume an organization’s espoused aim naturally leads to 
consistent managerial decisions and that these consistent decisions lead to actions that are thus 
consistent with the espoused aim. Counter to this view, Brunsson (1993b) provides a 
perspective which may better reflect realities for organizations, like universities, where tangible 
products are hard to demonstrate in practice (Brunsson, 1989).  In this view of organizational 
behaviour there is no such strong connection between talk, decisions and action of 
organizations.   
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As such, a key tenet of hypocrisy involves the explicit independence of these three 
distinct components (Brunsson, 1993b).  The ‘talk’ part is increasingly well articulated in the 
sustainability reporting literature where scholars have explored the role of hypocrisy in 
corporate sustainability disclosures (Cho et al., 2015) and CSR communications (Fassin & 
Buelens, 2011).  In this literature scholars examine qualities of the organizational façade (Cho 
et al., 2015) and develop means to evaluate the proneness of organizations to hypocrisy given 
the nature of the rhetorical devices they employ (Fassin & Buelens, 2011).  This work 
emphasises organizational hypocrisy brought about by inconsistency between talk and 
decision, aspects which are, naturally, closer to managerial influence (Brunsson, 1993b).  Thus 
this paper adds to these earlier studies of inconsistency at the talk-decision interface, by looking 
instead at the inconsistency at the decision-action interface, which has received limited 
conceptual and empirical attention in the prior literature. 
In other words, while these studies (e.g. Cho et al., 2015) advance our understanding of 
how organizational rhetoric may be subject to strategic manipulation, which can result in 
organizational hypocrisy, they do not account for a situation where hypocrisy arises despite 
plans to be consistent.  (Brunsson, 1993b; 2007) suggest that hypocrisy emerges when different 
parts of the organization respond independently to competing demands.  In this instance, 
hypocrisy as an ultimate outcome occurs, but as a failed attempt to motivate action that is 
consistent with its talk and decisions.  Brunsson (1993b:502) notes that hypocrisy is indeed 
something which can also arise despite “good intentions”.  Yet this kind of hypocrisy, as a 
consequence of an operational failure to implement, is less well studied.  Counter-posed with 
a view of hypocrisy as a cynical strategic manipulation this inadvertent kind of hypocrisy is 
not planned, but nonetheless generates the same risks and concerns associated with stakeholder 
perceptions of ‘green-washing’ (Bowen, 2015).  Here firms are viewed negatively if they are 
seen to signal commitment to the natural environment, but in reality neglect the issue in their 
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organizational practices (Bowen, 2015; Walker & Wan, 2012).  If the risks that follow are 
unplanned, they are perhaps yet more important for organizations to recognise, even if they are 
overlooked by the current literature. 
Therefore, to better understand this kind of inadvertent organizational hypocrisy, we 
explicitly seek to explore how talk and decision, which reside in close proximity to one another 
and relate to executive management, travel across the organizational hierarchy to be translated 
into action, at lower organizational levels (Brunsson, 1993b).  Further, we focus on a particular 
situation where there is already an established organizational consistency between this ‘talk’ 
and ‘decision’.  The hypocrisy thus arises when inconsistency arises in relation to the ‘action’.   
This action tends to occur at a lower organizational level, relating to the sub-groups of 
individuals tasked with carrying out the action.  There is usually a spatial and hierarchical 
separation between these sub-groups and executive management.  Specifically, Brunsson 
(1989) notes that the action required to be consistent with talk and decision rarely involves the 
same people in the same sub-groups or organizational divisions.   
Business schools provide a context where gaps between organizational rhetoric and 
actual activities might be expected (Alvesson & Gabriel, 2016).  The MBA program in 
particular, is an example of an established sub-group for many business schools (Wedlin, 
2007).  Its curriculum is also particularly important when appraising the seriousness with 
which business schools are taking their sustainability commitments, since it’s centrally and 
symbolically important to school strategy (Schliegelmilch & Thomas, 2011).  In this scenario, 
we position the dean’s office as responsible for the role of executive management including 
devising the organizational talk and deciding on school direction.  While the challenge for a 
business school in implementing strategy is wider than any one department or program, the 
MBA program, as a sub-group of the business school, can be thought of as representative of 
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the school’s action.  For a school that has committed to sustainability, and has consistent talk, 
decision and action, it follows that a presence of sustainability in the MBA can be reasonably 
expected.   
The literature on sustainability in management education also reflects this hierarchy 
and locates the drivers and barriers to implementation at multiple levels of analysis.  It suggests 
that organizational factors, as well as factors at the ‘coal-face’ involving the resources 
available, research interests and latitude of faculty are important (Matten & Moon, 2004; Moon 
& Orlitzky, 2011).   The influence of three factors, capacity, capability and the latitude of those 
tasked with delivering their business schools’ sustainability promise, are therefore of prime 
interest to this study and reflect the reasons Brunsson (1993b) gives to explain organizational 
hypocrisy.  Adding to this theorizing and drawing the role of organizational characteristics into 
the conceptualization also importantly reflects literature which suggests that two further factors 
in particular, prestige and size, may influence sustainability integration at business schools (e.g. 
Matten & Moon, 2004; Snelson-Powell et al., 2016).  These five key factors are each outlined 
in detail below. 
3.1 Prestige   
Brunsson (2007) argues that for organizations to be effective they must simultaneously 
address contradictory demands, and that they can achieve this through hypocrisy.  For example, 
some demands are met with talk, others with decision, and others with action, where the 
inconsistencies between these allows multiple competing issues to be reconciled at the same 
time.   Since this kind of talk-action inconsistency is linked to effective organizations it might 
thus be expected of prestigious organizations who can be viewed as among the most effective 
in a given field. 
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In the empirical context of business schools, scholars bring organizational status and 
market pressures into the explanation of how different schools behave in response to their 
stakeholders (Alvesson & Gabriel, 2016; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002).  Business school prestige is 
tightly linked to research quality and outputs (Armstrong, 1995), rather than teaching (Pfeffer 
& Fong, 2002).  Thus by leveraging its research excellence, a business school gains prestige, 
which in turn enables it to attract the best MBA students, who subsequently receive a salary 
premium upon graduation as a result of being awarded a degree from a more prestigious 
university (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002).  This dynamic means that MBA program changes and 
teaching innovations, such as the inclusion of sustainability material, may be less relevant in 
the competition for students, if they are attracted, primarily, by the prestige of the awarding 
school (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002).   
Alvesson and Gabriel’s (2016) work on grandiosity in management education supports 
this contention that the quest to gain or maintain prestige results in an emphasis of image over 
substance, or hypocrisy.  Brand identity has been found to be particularly important for 
students’ choice of postgraduate study in higher education more broadly (Nguyen, Yu, 
Melewar & Hemsley-Brown, 2016).  Alvesson & Gabriel (2016:465) argue that a drive to 
improve perceptions of status in the business school sector “involves the application of some 
smoke screens”.  Applying the concept of grandiosity to organizations reveals a situation where 
a persistent attempt to improve status, involves activities which provide a positive and socially 
desirable organizational image, with less concern for the reality.  Business schools are 
examples of organizations for which the appeal of grandiosity is palpable (Alvesson & Gabriel, 
2016), thus efforts to attain prestige, imply linkages to activities that involve smoke-screens, 
and superficiality. 
For less prestigious business schools, that don’t have the ability to compete for MBA 
students on the same terms as more research intensive counterparts (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002; 
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Navarro, 2008), status concerns may be less salient and innovations in the MBA may be viewed 
differently.  For example, sustainability teaching can instead be a different way to establish 
competitive differentiation.  Further, less prestigious business schools may have more to lose 
from hypocritical behavior if it’s revealed to stakeholders to be green-washing (Bowen, 2015).  
A less prestigious school, less well known in the market, does not have other forms of 
reputational capital to offset negative judgments of green-washing. We therefore anticipate, 
when it comes to the MBA program, that prestige will be associated with organizational 
hypocrisy and that less prestigious business schools will be associated with organizational 
consistency, specifically, that they will experience a greater pressure to develop sustainability-
related innovations in their MBA curriculum in order to align their activities with their school’s 
commitments.  
3.2 Size   
Organizational size is included in this analysis as a characteristic which is also expected 
to be linked with organizational hypocrisy.  While prestige is linked to rankings (Wedlin, 
2007), size is a broader measure of success and market power both in terms of potential 
research and teaching capacity.  Despite large organizations having amplified external 
expectations (Pfeffer & Salacnik, 1978) and experiencing enhanced pressures to be seen as 
consistent in their practices (Bromley & Powell, 2012) with greater external legitimacy at stake 
(Josefy, Kuba, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015) large organizations are in fact prone to “symbolic gaps” 
(Bowen, 2015:64).  Here organizational approaches have a greater tendency to be inconsistent, 
with an emphasis on symbolic over substantive corporate environmentalism (Bowen, 2015).  
Wickert, Scherer and Spence’s (2016) work supports this view, where they argue that large 
firms do more symbolic CSR and small firms do less CSR communication, but more in 
practice.   
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While previous studies of business school size and sustainability have shown that the 
relationship can be complex (Moon & Orlitzky, 2011), we have nonetheless established a 
general expectation that large business schools will be linked to organizational hypocrisy.  In 
summary, the success that size offers may consolidate a market-driven dynamic where 
pressures to continue with business-as-usual and conform via traditionally structured MBA 
offerings (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002) means that incorporating sustainability-related teaching 
innovations might be less compelling for larger schools.      
3.3 Capacity 
An organization’s capacity, such as its access to resources, influences the rate and the 
depth of organizational change (Ramirez, 2002).  Brunsson (1993b:491) explains that “ideas 
are cheaper than actions”.  Bromley, Hwang and Powell’s (2012) study finds a lack of 
resources an important reason for organizations’ failure to implement plans.  The same 
arguments apply at our lower level of analysis where we define capacity as the material 
resources available to individuals charged with policy implementation in a particular 
organizational structure, and thus we similarly expect less capacity to be linked with 
hypocrisy.   
Capacity has been shown to be a factor in the implementation of sustainability-related 
activities, such as CSR policies (Bowen, 2002).  And when it comes to the context of business 
schools implementing sustainability, case studies regularly feature the lack of resources as a 
key constraint which slows down the business school’s ability to integrate sustainability in 
the curriculum (Exter, Grayson & Maher, 2013). Coopey (2003) argues that in the UK 
business schools sector this tension of building and maintaining capacity to deliver on 
sustainability is particularly acute as a result of the increased pressure for business schools to 
become more financially independent. Changes to business schools’ funding (Wilson & 
McKiernan, 2012) means they must increasingly be more attuned to what the market place 
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wants rather than what the sustainability imperative may suggest is required.  Following from 
this business schools that do not have sufficient capacity may end up exhibiting organizational 
hypocrisy, with resources diverted to activities that appeal more directly to student 
recruitment (Doherty et al., 2015).   
3.4 Capability 
Capability, specifically the skills and knowledge residing in an organization is, like 
capacity, linked to the ability of an organization to implement a policy or commitment 
(Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003; Bansal, 2005; Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 2009). Similarly, 
Brunsson (1993b) suggests a lack of knowledge contributes to organizational hypocrisy.  He 
notes that while we may know how things ought to be, there is often less certainty in bringing 
them about in practice (Brunsson, 1993b). Doh and Tashman (2014) found that pedagogical 
constraints, and limitations in instructors’ knowledge, time and access to teaching material 
was a central reason why business schools did not comprehensively assimilate and integrate 
sustainability teaching in business schools. Such a lack of capability is indeed identified as a 
key barrier to implementation across the literature on sustainability integration in management 
education, and has been found to impede adoption in practice of sustainability and 
responsibility content in the curricula (Jones, Selby & Sterling, 2006; Maloni, Smith & 
Napshin, 2012; Solitander, et al., 2012).  Consequently, we anticipate that business schools 
with less capability will be associated with inadvertent organizational hypocrisy.  
3.5 Latitude  
We define latitude as the scope, desire and influence of individuals to achieve change 
within the organizational element in which they are situated.  This is especially important 
when organizational rhetoric is confusing or when an imperative is ambiguously 
conceptualized (Bromley & Powell, 2012).  Sustainability is a broadly defined term (Moon, 
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2007) and, by definition, requires some latitude in its interpretation for the implementation to 
be successful in a specific local context, where opacity is expected between those that ‘talk’ 
and create policies and those that ‘act’ and implement practices (Wijen, 2014).  Brunsson 
(1993b) reflects on the limited scope top management has in imposing control over talk-action 
consistency.  In fact a degree of individual latitude may be needed by internal actors 
responsible for implementation if they are required to interpret the policy into meaningful 
terms and enact the new practice themselves (Bromley & Powell, 2012).   
Sustainability in business schools is an area where resistance to imposed change 
features strongly. Where faculty teaching sustainability on an MBA program were themselves 
given latitude in how sustainability teaching was incorporated, they become more committed 
to its implementation (Benn & Dunphy, 2009).  Other literature on sustainability in 
management education cites faculty support as the most important factor in determining the 
integration of sustainability in the curricula (Matten & Moon, 2004).  And correspondingly, 
faculty resistance is a reason for obstruction to the organizational change intended (Maloni et 
al., 2012; Solitander et al., 2012).  We therefore propose that latitude both in the degree of 
autonomy and the scope to make change is an important condition in determining whether 
consistent action follows the organizational commitment.  
3.6 Conceptual model  
Cumulatively, we view the three factors of capability, capacity and latitude and the 
relative prestige and size of the business school as the five key influences on whether business 
schools are able to deliver on their sustainability commitment, or whether despite commitments 
and intentions to deliver on top management’s decisions to integrate sustainability, 
organizational hypocrisy arises.  
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With this framing we are interested in the effects of these factors together, and how 
they may interplay with one another to generate the outcome of interest, organizational 
hypocrisy, in different ways.  For example, having developed arguments for how both prestige 
and size are organizational factors that may be linked to organizational hypocrisy, studying 
them together allows to examine whether they are complementary or substitutable.  Other 
interdependencies are also of interest, such as those that might reveal nuance in the nature of 
available resources, is capacity or capability crucial, or are they both required and how these 
might interplay with organizational factors.  
Figure 1 summarizes this conceptual framing, integrating hypocrisy theory (with 
separate talk, decision and action elements) with the factors, or conditions, which are expected 
to operate together to explain either consistent or inconsistent action. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 In sum, Brunsson (1993b) already suggests there are internal factors that help align 
ideas and action and make hypocrisy less likely as an outcome; these relate to the capability, 
capacity and latitude available.  Our theoretical contribution involves integrating these with 
other, organization-level factors that we also conceptualise as fundamental in shaping 
inadvertent organizational hypocrisy.  If the most effective organizations leverage 
inconsistency and value organizational hypocrisy, then artefacts of their success, such as 
prestige and size, might play a part in explaining when organizational hypocrisy comes about 
and are thus required in how we conceptualise the drivers of this phenomenon. 
4. Method and research design 
4.1 Sample selection 
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We invited all 122 UK business schools to participate in this study, and 80 agreed to 
provide an interview with the dean, the MBA program director, or both.  This resulted in 123 
interviews in total.  As our study is explicitly concerned with only those business schools that 
had both sustainability commitments and consistent talk and decisions, our final sample was a 
sub-set of these schools which had made these commitments, had provided an interview with 
the dean so that we could establish talk-decision consistency and where they had also provided 
an interview with their MBA director, so we could establish consistency of action.  The final 
sample was 23 business schools. 
Thus creating this final sample involved two steps.  First, to determine whether the 
business school had a sustainability policy we looked for evidence that they either claimed 
adherence to a sustainability emphasis within the mission statement of the school, or they 
made some form of external sustainability-related commitment such as being a current 
signatory to UN’s PRME, ABIS or prior inclusion in the Aspen Institute’s Beyond Grey 
Pinstripes Ranking index.  Second, an examination of the deans’ accounts was performed to 
determine that there was a strategic decision to engage with sustainability at an organizational 
level.  The 23 business schools included in the sample therefore all had the intention to fulfil 
the external organizational talk and can be thought of as having consistent talk and decisions. 
This allowed us to explore the determinants of inadvertent organizational hypocrisy and 
conversely, organizational consistency, measured by the presence of sustainability in the 
MBA program. 
4.2 Measure of organizational hypocrisy 
The MBA curriculum was selected as the measure of hypocrisy since it provides a 
common basis for comparison between business schools.  MBA programs are regarded as a 
“standard feature” (Wedlin, 2007:24) which are often similarly arranged in terms of their ‘silo’ 
based structure (Navarro, 2008) and, in the UK, MBA programs are governed by a similar set 
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of regulation and accreditation requirements (Wilson & McKiernan, 2012).  It should be noted 
that at the time of our study, sustainability was not a requirement of accreditations bodies which 
might otherwise been expected to influence business school behaviour (Alajoutsijarvi, 
Kettunen, & Sohlo, 2018; Wedlin, 2007).   
Importantly, for this study, the MBA program is usually thought of as a key product or 
‘flag-ship’ of the school (Schleigelmilch & Thomas, 2011).  This allows us to examine an 
organizational sub-group that represents the ‘technical core’ (Zucker, 1987) and is arguably a 
key activity of the business school.  We can therefore consider it an instance of organizational 
hypocrisy if there are organizational commitments to sustainability at the same time as the 
opposite action - an absence of sustainability in this core aspect of the organization.   
4.3 Interviews 
Data was collected in a series of telephone interviews by a single researcher during a 
six-month period in 2011.  Analysing data collected in 2011 gives unique insights into 
organized hypocrisy since it relates to a particular point in time where pressures to appear 
responsible and sustainable were high, but where there was little in place to mandate 
corresponding activities in practice.  This is because we study a time following the financial 
crash of 2007/2008 which alerted broader stakeholders to the role of the business school in the 
corporate irresponsibility that occurred, but before ethics, responsibility and sustainability 
(ERS) were mandated in 2013 by accreditation bodies like EQUIS which stipulate that 
sustainability should be reflected in school activities (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015).  Our data 
therefore relates to a particularly salient time, where amplified expectations generated 
organizational talk (evidenced through a growing membership of PRME (see Godemann, 
Haertle, Herzig & Moon, 2014)) but where pressures to take action and implement 
sustainability in practice were less urgently experienced by business schools. 
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Participants of the interviews, business school deans and MBA program directors, 
were assured that their responses would be treated anonymously, such that their identity and 
that of their business school would not be disclosed in any published research.  Interviews 
were semi-structured, with the use of open questions followed by questions to encourage 
further disclosure or to probe for clarification. Pilot interviews were conducted initially, 
before refinements to improve the flow and encourage participation. Typically interviews 
lasted approximately 25-30 minutes, however some were shorter than this and some were 
significantly longer (up to about an hour).  The interviews were transcribed in full where 
transcriptions ranged from 2,000 to 5,500 words long.  The average word-count for a 
transcribed interview was about 4,000 words.   The dean interviews and the MBA program 
director interviews were coded with two different purposes in mind.  The dean interviews 
were coded to gauge whether the school had made decisions consistent with an executive 
intention to implement commitments to sustainability, for sample selection purposes.  The 
MBA program director interviews provided the basis on which to establish whether action 
had been taken in practice, in relation to sustainability in the MBA curriculum in particular.  
Further these interviews provided the basis on which to code for the presence of capability, 
capacity and latitude.    
All interviews were coded by the interviewer, with a sub-sample of six interviews 
coded by three researchers for rating robustness.  The sub-sample was coded first by two 
researchers, who met initially to establish thresholds and then met again with the third 
researcher to compare results and agree the coding.  Coding conclusions were similar, but in 
the few instances where divergence occurred, discussion between all three researchers 
established agreed measures collectively.  Remaining differences in opinion of the two 
researchers’ initial coding were handled by asking the third researcher for their rating.  From 
this base-line, coding was completed for all the remaining interviews by one researcher.  
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Further, in approaching the data, we were also alert to evidence of organizational consistency 
and organizational hypocrisy in the responses given, to help qualitatively illustrate the 
outcomes identified in the data by the fsQCA method adopted below.  In line with earlier 
QCA scholars, example quotes were collected that exhibited the outcomes of interest (Crilly, 
Zollo & Hansen, 2012; Snelson-Powell et al., 2016).   
4.4 Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
FsQCA is a set-theoretic approach designed for outcome-based work and is thus 
naturally suited to the study of organizational hypocrisy as an outcome. Our selection of 
fsQCA follows the work of several other scholars who have increasingly adopted it in 
business research in particular (e.g. Fiss, 2011; Mas-Verdu, Ribeiro-Soriano & Roig-Tierno, 
2015; Mikalef & Pateli, 2017; Plewa, Ho, Conduit & Karpen, 2016; Toth, Thiesbrummel, 
Henneberg & Naude, 2015).   
FsQCA assesses cross-case patterns by analysing subsets and superset relations, 
allowing researchers to draw conclusions about relationships between concepts.  For a given 
sample, it identifies combinations of factors, or conditions, that are associated with an 
outcome (Ragin, 2008) by comparing the presence or absence of conditions across multiple 
cases.  In our study the presence of the outcome is organizational hypocrisy and the absence 
of the outcome is organizational consistency.  Each case, or business school, exhibits either 
the presence or absence of the outcome and each represents a collection of relative 
memberships in the conditions. Viewing cases together, an algorithm based on Boolean logic, 
identifies configurations of conditions which are associated with each outcome.   
While fsQCA is increasingly used for large-sized samples (Misangyi et al., 2017), it is 
also well suited to our medium-sized sample (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  FsQCA has a 
further advantage when it comes to dealing with phenomenon occurring at different analytical 
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levels since it does not require perfect nestedness (Lacey & Fiss, 2009), a requirement which 
limits the applicability of traditional linear methods and the strict assumptions imposed (Ragin, 
2000).   
Ragin’s (2008) freely available software (fsQCA v.3.0) was used to analyze the data 
provided by the 23 MBA program directors’ accounts of activities relating to the MBA 
curriculum and secondary data relating to the business school itself.   
4.5 Condition calibration 
Great consideration is given to the selection and definition of the conditions under study 
and this requires researchers’ theoretical and context-based knowledge of the area to identify 
the conditions which are potentially important (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  Then for each 
condition, thresholds for what defines membership, partial membership or exclusion require 
careful specification (Ragin, 2008).  The term ‘fuzzy’ in fsQCA does not describe conceptual 
or statistical ambiguity (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), but rather it reflects the inclusion of 
degrees of membership as well as full membership in sets.  Other forms of QCA include crisp-
set QCA (e.g. Rey-Marti, Porcar, Mas-Tur, 2015), where membership is either in or out, and 
multi-variate QCA, where the condition can take on various values.  
The analysis of the conditions in this study involved coding of both crisp (for the 
outcome condition and for prestige) and fuzzy sets (for size, capability, capacity and latitude) 
where more granularity was valuable.  As per procedure in fsQCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012) the thresholds were determined based on researcher knowledge with a 4-way coding as 
follows; fully out (given a value of 0), mostly out (given a value of 0.33), mostly in (given a 
value of 0.67) and fully in, (given a value of 1). Crisps sets were coded for the prestige 
condition, with either 0 or 1 to indicate whether it was a member of the prestigious business 
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schools set or not and the outcome condition, where MBA programs were also judged in a 2-
way to be consistent (1) or not (0) in including sustainability.    
For each of the 23 cases we analysed the accounts of MBA program directors, to 
determine their membership of the internal conditions identified. Thresholds were defined, or 
‘calibrated’ (Ragin, 2008), by developing criteria for the degree of inclusion in the ‘set’ or 
condition. How the measures were calibrated from the qualitative data or from secondary data 
sources is detailed in Table 1 below. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Outcome condition.  Having already selected a sample with consistent ‘talk’ and 
‘decision’ the outcome condition was the degree to which business schools had aligned this 
commitment to sustainability, with the inclusion of sustainability in the MBA program, its 
‘action’.  The outcome condition relates to the presence of sustainability integration efforts.  If 
this condition was present, this action was deemed ‘consistent’.  If sustainability integration 
efforts were absent, the action was deemed ‘hypocrisy’.  We sought to assess each MBA 
program director’s account of their sustainability integration efforts in terms of the strength of 
the evidence they provided.  Future plans or deflective responses were not viewed as evidence 
of activity, and were coded as ‘0’ and out of the set of ‘consistent’ business schools.  Weak 
evidence, such as isolated examples of minimal activity such as trials or audits were rated 
similarly as an absence of the outcome condition and ‘hypocrisy’.  Substantive activity that 
may still be ad-hoc, but represented meaningful inclusion of sustainability-related material, 
was included within the set of ‘consistent’ business schools and coded ‘1’.  Other kinds of 
strong evidence, such that substantive activity had gone beyond inclusion of electives, 
including a sense of active monitoring and management were similarly coded in this set of 
consistent business schools.  By this measure those programs with sustainability in the core 
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content of the curricula, where MBA students are certain to graduate with exposure to these 
concepts, are viewed as walking-the-talk.  Of the 23 cases in the sample 11 were attributed to 
an organizational consistency and 12 to an organizational hypocrisy.  
Prestige. Business schools listed in the Financial Times (FT) Top 100 European 
Business Schools or in the top quartile of the Complete University Guide (CUG) 2011 for 
Business and Management Studies, were coded 1 to indicate prestige.  Those that did not appear 
in either were coded 0 to indicate their relatively lower prestige.  
Size. Size was gauged by the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) academic faculty 
at the business school. This secondary data was obtained from The Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA), which collects and disseminates data related to publicly funded higher 
education institutions in the UK.  We calibrated thresholds for size based on the approximate 
distribution of schools in the population of UK business schools.  We coded size using a 4-way 
measure, 0-49 FTE was coded as 0 (out of the set of large business schools), 50-99 FTE was 
0.33 (mostly out), 100-150 was 0.67 (mostly in) and 150+ was coded as 1 (in the set of large 
business schools).   
Capability. Capability is measured by the presence of existing internal expertise that is 
available to the MBA program director.  We coded capability using a 4-way measure. A 
relationship between the MBA program and a sustainability-related research centre may be a 
strong indication of the availability of internal expertise (and coded as fully in the set of those 
that have capability), as is the presence of multiple members of staff where this is a primary 
teaching or research interest (mostly in).  An absence of capability is measured by no (fully 
out) or little (mostly out) interest or expertise residing in the faculty that may be deployed by 
the MBA program. 
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Capacity. Capacity is related to the resources that are available to internal actors that 
are required to make change such that sustainability is integrated in the MBA program. We 
coded capacity using a 4-way measure.  A presence of capacity is described by sufficient 
support (fully in) or some resources (mostly in) such that sustainability can be integrated.  An 
absence of capacity is identified as a lack of resources that is constraining (mostly out) or 
preventing (fully out) new activities. 
Latitude.  Latitude relates to the ability of internal actors to influence change, both in 
terms of autonomy and the level of resistance faced by the MBA program director in making 
change happen in practice.  We coded latitude using a 4-way measure.  MBA program directors 
who have no scope to make change (fully out) or face significant resistance (mostly out) are 
displaying an absence of latitude.  Those who evidence progression of change they have been 
able to make (mostly in) or a large level of control over the content of the MBA program (fully 
in) have a presence of latitude. 
4.6 Data analysis 
Analysing data with fsQCA involves three steps.  Once the values for each condition 
for each case have been determined the first step is to construct a ‘truth table’ of logically 
possible combinations of conditions (Ragin, 2008).  A truth table has 2k rows, where k 
indicates the number of causal conditions included in the analysis (Fiss, 2011).  While 
logically possible, some rows may not feature among the cases, while other rows may 
represent more than one case with the same set of causal conditions.  The rows are then sorted 
by frequency of empirical instantiation, with the most often occurring combination of causal 
conditions at the top.    
The next step is to reduce the number of rows in the table, using two criteria.  The first 
being a frequency cut-off decision for the minimum number of cases that are necessary for a 
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configuration to be considered legitimate.  Our frequency cut-off was a single case, in-line 
with earlier studies involving a similar sample size (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  The 
second criteria relates to the ‘consistency’ threshold of greater than 0.8 (Schneider & 
Wageman, 2012).   The truth tables are presented in appendices at the end of this paper.   A 
final step, with a further algorithm produces a simplified output of the statistically consistent 
combinations. Results of an fsQCA procedure, involve a ‘solution’ for both the presence and 
absence of the outcome.  This solution comprises ‘configurations’, which are combinations 
of conditions that are found to be statistically robust and empirically important for the 
outcome under study (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).   
5. Results  
  FsQCA is inherently a configurational perspective.  However, to ensure that the results 
are best represented configurationally, a necessity pre-test ensures that no condition, 
individually, is necessary for the presence or absence of the outcome.  The results of this test 
are reported in the appendices (see Table 6).  A necessary condition features whenever the 
outcome is present (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012) and we confirmed that neither a presence 
nor an absence of the individual conditions were required for either the presence or absence of 
the outcome. 
A table of results of the fsQCA solutions for the presence and absence of the outcome, 
‘Organizational hypocrisy’ and ‘Organizational consistency’ is presented in Table 2, where 
two configurations comprise the solution for the presence and absence of the outcome.  A 
configuration, or path, is a combination of several conditions that operate conjunctionally.   
------------------------------- 






5.1 Consistency and coverage values 
Understanding consistency values and coverage values, which feature in the results 
table above, is important in interpreting the results.  Consistency values indicate the degree to 
which the empirically observed cases agree with the proposed subset relation (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  More precisely the consistency value is the percentage of cases’ set-
membership values that reflect a subset (or superset) relation (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
Consistency values are reported for each of the individual configurations that comprise the 
solution for each outcome as well as the consistency values for the overall solutions in each 
case. A consistency value greater than 0.8 is considered acceptable (Fiss, 2011).  Our result for 
the solution consistency value for the outcome of organizational consistency is 0.868 and for 
organizational hypocrisy is 0.91.   The configurations presented here have consistency values 
between 0.835 and 1.0 and are thus above the recommended threshold.   
The term, solution coverage provides a proportionate indication of the number cases 
that are explained by the overall solution (Ragin 2008).  Coverage can be thought of as an 
expression of the relevance of a configuration (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  More 
precisely, solution coverage is the percentage of the cases’ set membership in an outcome 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).  Solution coverage values indicate the proportion of the cases 
which have set-membership in the outcome; organizational consistency (0.395) and for 
organizational hypocrisy (0.278).  Raw coverage and unique coverage values relate to 
individual configurations, or paths, within the solution.  Raw coverage is the percentage of the 
cases’ set membership in an outcome for that single path of the solution (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  Unique coverage is the percentage of the cases’ set membership in an 
outcome only for that single path of the solution (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).   
5.2 FsQCA solutions 
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FsQCA results can be presented in different ways from the simplest presentation of the 
empirical findings being the ‘parsimonious’ solution to the increasingly more conservative 
presentations of the ‘intermediate’ and then the ‘complex’ solution (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012).  The parsimonious and intermediate solutions involve computer and researcher guided 
assumptions respectively in the solution simplification process.  Complex solutions are not 
based on simplifying assumptions but can be less easy to interpret.  To aid interpretation, 
scholars are therefore guided to denote those conditions that also feature in the parsimonious 
solution as ‘core’ and the remaining conditions  as ‘peripheral’ (Fiss, 2011).  This achieves a 
balance in preserving both the clarity of the parsimonious solution and the fullness of the 
explanation in more complex solutions.   
The fsQCA solutions produced here in Table 2 are based on the most conservative 
solution, without simplifying assumptions and, having looked also at the parsimonious 
solution, core and peripheral notation is added to aid interpretation.  The solutions comprise 
two configurations for ‘organizational consistency’ (configurations 1a and 1b) and two 
configurations for ‘organizational hypocrisy’ (configurations 2a and 2b).  The configurations 
for organizational consistency (1a and 1b) feature the following combination: the absence of 
prestige with the presence of capability as core conditions in combination with the presence of 
latitude as a peripheral condition.  1a and 1b differ in that they each feature a different 
peripheral condition, one being the absence of size and the other being the absence of capacity.  
What these configurations show, primarily, is that less prestigious business schools that have 
capability in sustainability are linked with consistent action in their approach to actually 
integrating sustainability into the MBA curriculum.   
The two configurations for organizational hypocrisy (2a and 2b) feature the following 
combination: the presence of prestige, the absence of capability with the presence of latitude 
as core conditions.  2a and 2b differ in that they each feature a different peripheral condition, 
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one being the presence of size and the other being the presence of capacity. What these 
configurations show, primarily, is that inconsistent action, where sustainability content remains 
absent from the MBA curriculum despite organizational promises, is linked to more prestigious 
business schools that don’t have high levels of sustainability capability in their organizations, 
and where the MBA program director has some discretion in the change they are able to impact 
in the curriculum. Referring to the qualitative evidence collected, see the table below, relating 
to the absence and presence of the outcome of interest; organizational consistency and 
organizational hypocrisy, there is support for the idea that organizational hypocrisy and 
organizational consistency are experienced as different states by MBA program directors.   
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
These quotes demonstrate something about the requirement for the agenda to traverse 
organizational hierarchies if organizational hypocrisy is to be prevented (Brunsson, 2007).  In 
the event there is a disconnect, organizational hyprocrisy is a feature, for example in the 
comment from one MBA program director, “the discourse has been initiated from the top, but I 
don’t know whether there has been very much engagement with that, I think it is very much at the level 
of rhetoric rather than reality and practice” can be counter-posed with one where the agenda has 
been able to work through the school “it is part of the ethos of the school and it does work through 
into the way that people think about the way they put courses together”.   
6. Discussion 
This section interprets these results and discusses the implications for theory by 
considering how combinations of factors and the relations between them explain consistent or 
inconsistent action at business schools in our sample.   This section concludes with a summary 
of the consequences of this analysis for organizational hypocrisy theory. 
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6.1 Explaining organizational hypocrisy  
Our results suggest that hypocrisy, as gauged by the lack of sustainability in the MBA 
for those schools in our sample, with explicit sustainability commitments, is primarily linked 
with prestigious business schools that lack capability in sustainability and where MBA program 
directors have latitude to influence the curriculum.  While earlier work has suggested these 
factors individually are important, we can inform the debate showing how they might operate 
in conjunction, and in doing so improve understanding of these effects.  For example, some 
studies find that more prestigious business schools may enjoy a ‘buffer’ from social 
expectations (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015), where they do not experience pressure to change their 
MBA curriculum, because their prestige flows from their research and not from their teaching 
innovations, such as sustainability. Yet other scholars find a positive association between 
prestige and sustainability engagement across the school more broadly (Matten & Moon, 2004; 
Snelson-Powell et al., 2016).  Our results offer some specificity to the research to date and 
show a different picture when looking at the MBA in particular, and reflect a model where 
hypocrisy is associated with prestigious business schools when they lack relevant capability 
and the MBA program director has latitude.  
 Recognizing that different stakeholders have different measures of organizational 
hypocrisy, where they have different and partial perceptions of what organizational action 
occurs (Cho et al., 2015), may aid our overall interpretation of these findings.  In higher 
education contexts Plewa et al. (2016) find differences even amongst how different types of 
students; domestic or international – perceive HEIs and whether they attend to course-level 
aspects, support available or the wider university context. Thus, the absence of sustainability 
in the MBA, may not be problematic to all constituents.   Certainly, despite well-argued 
criticism (Gioia, 2002) business schools have been found to enjoy marked success in recent 
times (Dyllick, 2015) continuing to grow and prosper, all the while disconnecting their rhetoric 
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from reality (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015).  While this success is odds with an organization which 
is apparently green-washing and should expect to face disapproval (Bromley & Powell, 2012; 
Bowen, 2015) these results suggest that the organizational hypocrisy exhibited, may not be 
similarly apparent or important to all stakeholders. Conversely, the finding that the less 
prestigious business schools with sustainability capability are able to deliver on their 
sustainability commitment aligns with our theorizing, and is perhaps the clearest evidence yet 
that differently positioned business schools experience different competitive pressures.  
Scholars understand that HEIs with different levels of reputational capital handle competitive 
threats differently (Rutter, Roper & Lettice, 2016). This finding tells us something more 
specific; developing teaching innovations and achieving sustainability integration may become 
a key differentiator for less prestigious business schools, which cannot compete with more 
prestigious business schools who are valued instead for the enhanced career prospects of 
graduates who expect greater salaries and accelerated promotion (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). 
The importance of this capability, in combination with prestige,is clearly reflected in 
the fsQCA solutions, which tell us something of the particular salience of capability in 
successfully implementing sustainability in MBA programs, and thus preventing 
organizational hypocrisy at less prestigious business schools.  This result follows theoretical 
expectations that capability is paramount when implementing sustainability and supports the 
findings of earlier surveys (e.g. Matten & Moon, 2004), case-studies (e.g. Maloni et al., 2012) 
and chimes with Brunsson’s (1993b) ideas that knowledge helps align ideas and action.   
The combination of prestige with lack of capability and latitude discussed above, 
operates with two additional, though peripheral, factors.  Specifically, one configuration adds 
a large size to this explanation, and the other configuration includes the capacity, or availability 
of resources. We discuss these two peripheral aspects of the model in turn.  First the additional 
visibility and success of the large schools may similarly serve to buffer those schools from the 
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need to change their MBA programs to include sustainability, despite their rhetorical 
commitments.  This finding is in line with Rasche and Gilbert’s (2015) explanations for why 
some business schools may not walk their talk and also supports Bowen’s (2015) work on 
symbolic gaps where large firms are more likely to engage symbolically with corporate 
environmentalism, but are not more likely to substantively implement.  The second peripheral 
factor that combines with our main model involves a presence of capacity implying that despite 
resources being available to the MBA program they are not naturally applied to sustainability 
integration efforts.   This has implications for both theory (Brunsson, 1993b) and the business 
school literature which suggest the converse - that lack of capacity is a barrier (Moon & 
Orlitzky, 2011; Solitander et al., 2012).  From this we can infer a clarification; by taking a 
combinational-view of determinants providing capacity may of course be helpful in principle, 
but when viewed alongside factors such as capability, capacity is not a necessity. 
6.2 Explaining organizational consistency  
Comparing the results for organizational hypocrisy with organizational consistency, 
there is some symmetry across these findings that relate to the combination of prestige and 
capability, as noted above.  The symmetry applies also to the peripheral conditions of size and 
capacity, reflecting the arguments discussed above.  However, latitude which features as a 
peripheral condition, operates asymmetrically.  At the same time the results show that latitude 
is part of the configurational explanation of hypocrisy it also features to explain organizational 
consistency (as a peripheral condition) for the converse outcome.  It is possible to derive 
explanations for both of these positions.  On the one hand to enact the sustainability signalled 
by the organization is not trivial and requires some latitude at the sub-group level to work out 
what is required in practice.  Key literature on sustainability in higher education argues that 
‘bottom-up’ processes are necessary for sustainability integration efforts (see Jones et al., 
2006).  However, the argument applies in reverse in that to resist organizational instructions to 
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implement sustainability, also requires some authority, or latitude. Our findings, in part, 
support earlier literature which identifies faculty barriers among the key reasons stopping 
business schools from implementing sustainability (Moon & Orlitzky, 2011; Maloni et al., 
2012), as well as revealing that the situation is more nuanced than earlier literature reflects.   
6.3 Implications for the organizational hypocrisy perspective 
Organizational hypocrisy is a feature of effective firms (Brunsson, 1989).  Yet we also 
know that when organizational hypocrisy relates to social responsibilities stakeholders are 
expected to disapprove (Bromley & Powell, 2012).  Scholars have found that organizational 
performance may suffer when green-washing (Bowen, 2015) or corporate irresponsibility is 
revealed (Price & Sun, 2017; Sweetin et al., 2013) which may damage an organizations’ 
prestige or standing (Herzig & Moon, 2013).   
Our analysis has introduced some nuance to these existing views of corporate social 
irresponsibility and organizational hypocrisy by demonstrating the relevance of organizational 
characteristics, in combination with sub-group level factors, where there is differentiation in 
how this phenomenon is observed for different kinds of organizations.  Brunsson’s (1993b) 
conceptualisation of sub-group level factors as reasons which explain how organizational 
hypocrisy arises is already convincingly argued.  However, what had been missing is an 
account of how these may play out differently for different kinds of organizations, depending 
on their prestige or size for example, and this is where this research contributes.   
7. Conclusion 
In sum, this paper lends support to Brunsson’s thesis that talk and action are 
independent and demonstrates inadvertent organizational hypocrisy as an empirical outcome 
in a business school context.  This is no surprise given that a university setting has been used 
to elaborate and exemplify the concept of organizational hypocrisy (Brunsson, 1989) and that 
business schools are subject to criticisms for not walking-the-talk (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015).  
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However, in completing this research, our findings allow us to offer some additions to earlier 
work.  By studying organizational hypocrisy arising from inconsistency between decision and 
action, in particular, we contribute to the literature by illuminating an unintended kind of 
organizational hypocrisy and its key determinants.  Further, within this analysis we have been 
able to establish the requirement to include organizational characteristics, such as prestige and 
size into the theoretical framing.  In doing so, we have been able to make some particular 
contributions to theory and the literature in our empirical context, learning about the salience 
of prestige and the importance of capability, together, to understand how organizational 
hypocrisy can arise at business schools.  
This paper has focused on the idea that organizational hypocrisy is not always 
something that is strategic or managed, but rather something that can arise for other reasons 
(Brunsson, 1993b).  Scholars have indicated this possibility before.  For example, Bowen 
(2015) urges us to think beyond a purely deliberative view of strategic greenwashing to include 
more inadvertent perspectives where symbolic gaps also arise as unintended consequences.  
However, this perspective has not received systematic empirical attention in earlier literature, 
and this paper addresses this gap, by looking in particular at a situation where organizational 
hypocrisy arises at business schools with sustainability commitments and is a consequence of 
inconsistent action in relation to including sustainability in their MBA programs.  With a focus 
on the activity in a business school’s MBA program in particular, further work is recommended 
to examine both the other ways in which business schools can enact commitment to 
sustainability and the degree to which they are successful at developing graduates who become 
responsible managers. 
The insights provided by this study of organizational hypocrisy assume business 
schools are under pressure to respond to public concerns over corporate irresponsibility.  At 
the time the data was collected, these expectations were not mandatory requirements.  Recent 
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institutional developments may provide fertile ground for further research. In particular, 
accreditation agencies (Slager et al., 2018) have more recently moved to explicitly call for 
sustainability in the curriculum and further research is therefore suggested to determine 
whether these criteria have more impact than PRME commitments. Although Moratis (2016) 
and Louw (2015) give grounds for skepticism regarding the extent of organizational change, 
Slager et al. (2018) see more links between the developments in accreditation requirements and 
the pressure business schools face to implement sustainability in practice.  These developments 
in accreditation criteria provide an opportunity, in future work, both to investigate the extent 
of hypocrisy under stronger external mandates and to explore the impact of these mandates on 
the motivations for both planned and inadvertent organizational hypocrisy. 
Our work also has implications for other educational services providers and higher 
education settings more generally.  With increasing moves to commercialise education and a 
more competitive market for students, ideas of brand management, reputation and image are 
becoming ever more important (Hemsley-Brown et al., 2016).  As corresponding tensions arise 
from these emerging pressures, organizational hypocrisy may be similarly predicted, where 
organizational facades (Cho et al., 2015) increasingly serve an organizational purpose.  Our 
work and findings around prestige, capability and latitude, suggest new studies to unpack 
hypocrisy in higher education settings like universities, where the pursuit of prestige is 
important (Alvesson & Gabriel, 2016), but where relevant sustainability knowledge and the 
power to implement change may be challenging to secure.  
Finally, the results of this study offer some practical implications for the 
implementation of sustainability in business school programs in particular. Generically 
increasing resources available to the MBA might not be the answer.  An important insight of 
our work is the finding that, within our data, the local context is relevant in explaining 
organizational hypocrisy.  In particular, we found that capability is a key component of our 
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explanations of hypocrisy and that business school leaders seeking to avoid inadvertent 
organizational hypocrisy and implement their sustainability commitments, should recruit 
specialist skills and knowledge providing the MBA with the required capability to deliver the 
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Table 3. Example quotes from MBA program director interviews 
 
Explanatory quotes 
Organizational consistency Organizational hypocrisy 
“I think to some extent everybody is 
integrating it, but it is a matter of 
degree” 
 
“[sustainability is not seen here as a] 
typical challenge, where oh it is 
something else we need to do, as if we 
do not have already enough boxes to 
tick” 
 
“I think it is part of the ethos of the 
school and it does work through into 
the way that people think about the 
way they put courses together and 
how they teach them” 
 
 
“sustainability is an incidental issue rather than a core 
theme” 
 
“I wouldn’t call us evangelists or pioneers…we are kind of 
foot in the water people at the moment” 
 
“the discourse has been initiated from the top, but I don’t 
know whether there has been very much engagement with 
that, I think it is very much at the level of rhetoric rather 
than reality and practice” 
  
“at the level of rhetoric our dean will say sustainability is 
very very important part of what the business school is 
trying to achieve…But at a programme level and level of 
ordinary everyday learning and teaching I don’t think it 
features” 
 
“I think if you talk to our dean they will emphasise that 
sustainability is critical and it is a key theme of the 
business school but it is rather interesting we have just 
revalidated our MBAs…And that didn’t actually feature at 




























Table 6. Results of the necessity analysis for both the absence (organizational 
consistency) and presence (organizational hypocrisy) of the outcome 
 
Condition Organizational consistency  Organizational hypocrisy  
Consistency value Coverage value Consistency 
value 
Coverage value 
Prestige 0.273 0.300 0.583 0.700 
Size 0.530 0.493 0.499 0.507 
Capacity 0.395 0.336 0.723 0.666 
Capability 0.636 0.678 0.277 0.322 
Latitude 0.607 0.488 0.585 0.512 
~Prestige 0.727  0.615 0.417 0.385 
~Size 0.470 0.462 0.501 0.538 
~Capacity 0.605 0.667 0.278 0.333 
~Capability 0.723 0.684 0.723 0.685 
~Latitude 0.393 0.465 0.415 0.535 
 
 
 
 
